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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Raymond Gene Corbus appeals from the district court's order of restitution
requiring Corbus to pay for medical expenses incurred by Terry Clark as a result of
injuries he sustained when he exited Corbus's moving vehicle while Corbus was
driving recklessly and eluding law enforcement.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Deputies Christopher Banks and Allen Long attempted to conduct a traffic
stop on Corbus's truck after he observed it "traveling at least 60 mph in a 35 mph
zone."

(R., p.6; UPSI, p.1.)

Corbus turned his headlights off and continued to

accelerate up to speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour as the deputies, who were
in separate patrol units, pursued him. (R., p.6; UPSI, p.1.) When Corbus slowed to
approximately 40 to 50 miles per hour and "attempt[ed] to turn off on a dirt road," his
passenger, Terry Clark, "jumped out of the vehicle . . . and was knocked
unconscious." (UPSI, p.1.) Corbus "continued driving another 300 yards before
hitting a rock and stopping."

(UPSI, p.1.)

Corbus admitted drinking and

acknowledged he saw the deputies pursuing him, but indicated he "just wanted to
keep going." (UPSI, pp.1-2.) Corbus's passenger, Mr. Clark, was flown to Saint
Alphonsus Medical Center for treatment of his injuries. (UPSI, p.2.)
Corbus was arrested for and the state subsequently charged him with
felony eluding, reckless driving, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.16-18.) At his
arraignment, Corbus pled guilty to reckless driving. (6f19f06 Tr., ppA-17.)
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Corbus later entered a conditional guilty plea
to felony eluding, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss,
and the state dismissed the driving without privileges charge. (R., pp.102-04.) The
written plea agreement also includes the following term:

(3) "That the State will

recommend ... (f) Restitution to be determined for injuries to Terry Clark." (R.,
p.103.) Pursuant to the state's request, the court ordered a restitution report when
Corbus entered his plea. (5/21/071 Tr., p.22, Ls.2-6; R., p.100.)
At sentencing, the court imposed a unified five-year sentence with one and
one-half years fixed for felony eluding and a concurrent 120-day sentence for
reckless driving.

(R., pp.111-13.)

The court, however, suspended execution of

Corbus's sentence and placed him on probation.

(R., p.113.) The court did not

order restitution at the time of sentencing because the state needed additional time
to prepare the restitution report. (7/16/07 Tr., p.2, Ls.3-6.) Nevertheless, the court
ordered Corbus to "pay restitution to the victims in the amount to be determined" as
a condition of probation. (R., p.114.)
A Restitution Report was filed on August 13,2007, stating the "[gjrand total of
restitution" for Mr. Clark's medical expenses was $18,203.67. (R., pp.138-39.) On
September 17, 2007, the court held a hearing regarding restitution at which Corbus
indicated he did not dispute the amount of restitution due. (R., p.152.) However, for
reasons which are not clear in the record, the hearing was continued to November 5,
2007. (R., p.152.)

The date on the transcript heading erroneously reads May 21, 2006, however, the
correct date is May 21, 2007. (See R., p.95.)
1
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On November 4, 2007, Corbus filed a "Notice of Authority" in which he
"notifie[d]" the "Court and Counsel that the case of State v. Shafer, 2007 Idaho
32774) (March 8, 2007) (Case Maker), would seem to be the controlling case in this
matter." (R., p.155.) Corbus further asserted:
Essentially, [Corbus] argues that the alleged victim's losses in
this case are not the result of [his] criminal conduct.
Basically,
[Corbus] pled guilty to a charge of Felony Eluding for exceeding the
speed limit and failing to stop in a timely fashion upon the police
officer's using their overhead lights and siren. During the course of the
evasion, the passenger, who was on felony probation, voluntarily
elected, without [Corbus's] consent, knowledge or intent, leapt [sic]
from the moving vehicle and sustained traumatic physical injury.
[Corbus] would ask the Court to take judicial notice of its file in
State v. Terry Clark, an Elmore County Case, wherein Mr. Clark
previously admitted to a Probation Violation for having consumed
alcohol with [Corbus] in [sic] the night in question. [Corbus] submits
that Mr. Clark leapt from the moving rig in an effort to keep from being
charged with a Probation Violation, and not as a result of the charge of
Felony Eluding.
(R., pp.155-56.)
At the hearing on November 5, 2007, the state asked for additional time to
review and respond to Corbus's Notice of Authority. (R., p.157.) The court granted
the state's request and set the matter over to November 19, 2007. (R., p.158.)
On November 19, 2007, the state requested additional time to submit its
position in writing, which the court granted. 2

(11/19/07 Tr., pp.1-3.)

The parties

agreed, at that time, to submit the matter for the court's consideration without any
additional hearings.

(Id.) On December 14, 2007, the court entered an Order of

Restitution for $18,203.67 for medical expenses, concluding there was a "sufficient

The record on appeal does not include a written submission from the state regarding
restitution, nor does the register of actions reflect any such document was filed prior to the
entry of the restitution order.
2
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causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and
the injuries Mr. Clark sustained."

(R., pp.162-65.) Corbus filed a notice of appeal

timely only from the Order of Restitution. (R., pp.183-85.)
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ISSUE
Corbus states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by imposing restitution in the amount of

$18,206.677
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court correctly conclude there was a "sufficient causal
connection" between Corbus's criminal conduct and Mr. Clark's injuries such that Mr.
Clark was entitled to restitution for his medical expenses?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Concluded There Was A "Sufficient Causal Connection"
Between Mr. Clark's Injuries And Corbus's Criminal Conduct Such That Mr. Clark
Was Entitled To Restitution For His Medical Expenses

A.

Introduction
Corbus asserts the district court erred in awarding Mr. Clark restitution,

contending Mr. Clark's injuries were the result of his own "independent, voluntary
act," not Corbus's criminal conduct. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) To the contrary, the
district court correctly concluded there was a sufficient causal connection between
Corbus's criminal acts of felony eluding and reckless driving such that Mr. Clark was
entitled to restitution for the injuries he sustained when he exited the moving vehicle.
Corbus has failed to establish otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution is committed to the trial court's

discretion, and the trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be
disturbed if supported by sUbstantial evidence. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692,
169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007).
The appellate court exercises free review over the application and
construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502,505,80 P.3d 1103, 1106
(Ct. App. 2003).
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C.

Mr. Clark Is Entitled To Restitution In This Case For The Medical Expenses
He Incurred As A Result Of Corbus's Criminal Conduct
Idaho's restitution statutes require Corbus to compensate victims who are

injured by his criminal actions.

I.C. § 19-5302 ("If a district court or magistrate's

division orders the defendant to pay restitution, the court shall order the defendant to
pay such restitution to the victim or victims injured by the defendant's actions."); I.C.

§ 19-5304(2) ("Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss which the victim
actually suffers."). "Medical expenses resulting from [Corbus's] criminal conduct" are
a compensable "economic loss" under the statute. I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).
"One of the purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur
the cost and inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation
for their losses." State v. Schultz, 2008 WL 5205887 *2 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations
omitted).

The public policy underlying the statute "favor[s] full compensation to

crime victims who suffer economic loss." State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768
P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989); see also, State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 811, 53
P.3d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that "restitution must be directed toward
correcting a harm or paying a cost that results from the defendant's crime").
"Restitution orders also operate for the benefit of the state, in part because they
promote the rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the criminal law." State v. Doe,
146 Idaho 277, _,192 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Olpin, 140
Idaho 377, 378, 93 P.3d 708, 709 (Ct. App. 2004)).
"[O]etermination of economic loss [is] based upon the civil preponderance of
evidence standard." Doe, 146 Idaho at _ , 192 P.3d at 1108 (citing I.C. § 195304(6)).

Further, "there must be a causal connection between the conduct for
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which the defendant is convicted and the damages the victim suffers." Schultz at *2
(citing State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372, 161 P.3d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2007)).
On appeal, Corbus "asserts that the district court erred in ordering any
restitution because there was no evidence that [Mr. Clark's) injuries were the result
of Mr. Corbus' criminal conduct." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Corbus argues Mr. Clark's
injuries were instead "the result of an independent, voluntary act of [Mr. Clark) to
jump out of the vehicle as it was moving, in order to potentially escape for allegedly
violating his probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Corbus's argument fails.
Nothing in the restitution statutes, or the case law interpreting those statutes,
requires a court to evaluate the subjective intent of a victim in responding to a
defendant's criminal actions before awarding restitution. Nor has Corbus cited any
authority for the proposition that a victim's subjective intent constitutes an
intervening "cause" excusing a defendant from the consequences of his actions.
Rather, the law only requires a "causal connection between the conduct for which
the defendant is convicted and the damages the victim suffers." Schultz at *2. The
district court found the requisite connection in this case, stating:
The victim in this case is Terry Clark. Mr. Clark was a
passenger in the defendant's vehicle when he was engaging in the
acts of Felony Eluding and Reckless Driving. During the police chase,
Mr. Clark, fearing for his safety, got out of the defendant's vehicle while
it was moving and was seriously injured. The restitution investigator
has submitted information showing that Mr. Clark's medical bills totaled
$18,203.67. It is this amount that is sought in restitution from the
defendant.

In the court's view, there is sufficient causal connection between
the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the injuries Mr.
Clark sustained. Mr. Clark was afraid because he was a passenger in
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the defendant's vehicle which he was driving at a high rate of speed
with his headlights off on a road where other vehicles were located. It
was not unreasonable for Mr. Clark to decide that he might be better
off 'bailing out' of the vehicle rather than risk more serious injuries in
the event that the defendant wrecked the vehicle. There is no reason
to believe that Mr. Clark would have left the defendant's vehicle, while
it was moving, had the defendant not been engaged in the criminal
actions that constituted Felony Eluding and Reckless Driving. See,
e.g., State v. Hill, 2002 WL 31082005, *1-2 (Wash. Ct. App.)
(Defendant, convicted of assault, could be required to pay restitution to
a victim, who, after the assault, panicked and fled away in a car at a
high rate of speed and lost control of the car and crashed after running
a red light at an intersection; sufficient causal connection existed
because the victim's actions were "'not only foreseeable, but highly
likely. "').
(R., pp.163-64.)

That Corbus believes Mr. Clark jumped out of his moving vehicle for a
different reason is purely speculative and ultimately irrelevant so long as there is a
connection between Corbus's criminal conduct - felony eluding and reckless driving
- and Mr. Clark's injuries.

Whether Mr. Clark wanted to exit Corbus's moving

vehicle to reduce his risk of injury or to avoid being charged with a probation
violation (a more unlikely motivation given that he could be charged with a probation
violation even if he jumped out), does not break the causal connection since either
reason was the direct result of Corbus's criminal conduct.

Corbus's reliance on

State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007), for a contrary
conclusion is misplaced.
Shafer was charged with and convicted of leaving the scene of an injury
accident for leaving the scene without providing any identification or assistance after
his car "collided with another vehicle in an intersection." Shafer, 144 Idaho at 371,
161 P.3d at 690. ''The other driver's car was a total loss, and she suffered several
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injuries requiring medical attention."

lli.

Shafer pled guilty and agreed to pay

restitution, but later objected to paying restitution "arguing that the[ ] damages were
not attributable to the crime to which he had pleaded guilty - leaving the scene of
the accident - but rather to the accident itself." Id. The district court agreed, but
ordered Shafer to nevertheless pay restitution since he "had consented to pay [it] as
a term of his plea agreement."

lli.

Shafer appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded Shafer was required to
pay restitution pursuant to the plea agreement, but in dicta agreed with Shafer and
the district court that there was no causal connection between the offense to which
Shafer pled guilty and the requested restitution. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372-75, 161
P.3d at 691-94. In doing so, the Court of Appeals reasoned that although the fact of
an accident is an element of leaving the scene of an injury accident, because the
"State need not prove that the defendant was responsible for the accident, and a
guilty plea for leaving an injury accident is not an admission of fault in the accident
itself," imposing restitution based solely on a conviction of that crime is insufficient to
support an order of restitution under I.C. § 19-5304.

lli.

at 373, 161 P.3d at 692.

The Court of Appeals, however, acknowledged the possibility "that a victim could
suffer injuries from a driver's unlawfully leaving the scene, as where the victim's
injuries are aggravated or death results because the defendant did not stop and
render aid," but concluded that because there was "no evidence of such damages in
th[at] case," there was no basis for concluding the victim suffered economic loss as
a result of Shafer's criminal conduct.

lli.
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Unlike in Shafer, a causal connection exists between the crimes to which
Corbus pled guilty and Mr. Clark's injuries. The elements of felony eluding are: (1)
"willfully flee[ing] or attempt[ing] to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a
visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop" while (2) (a) "[t]ravel[ing] in
excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed limit;" (b) "[c]aus[ing]
damage to the property of another or bodily injury to another;" (c) driving "in a
manner as to endanger or likely to endanger the property of another or the person of
another;" or (d) "[I]eav[ing] the state."

I.C. § 49-1404(1)-(2).

The elements of

reckless driving are: (1) driving "carelessly and heedlessly or without due caution
and circumspection;" and (2) "at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or be likely
to endanger any person or property, or who passes when there is a line in his lane
indicating a sight distance restriction." I.C. § 49-1401.
With respect to felony eluding, the state's information alleged Corbus eluded
law enforcement, "and in so doing either:"
(a) traveled in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted
speed limit, to-wit: in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a 55 and/or 65 m.p.h.
speed zone(s) or (b) drove his vehicle in a manner as to endanger or
be likely to endanger the property of another or the person of another,
to-wit: the Defendant drove in a reckless manner including speeding in
excess of 100 m.p.h., passing other vehicles, and turning off his
headlights after sunset, ....
(R., p.17 (emphasis added).)

Similarly, the state alleged Corbus committed the crime of reckless driving by
driving "carelessly and heedlessly; without due caution and Circumspection and/or at
a speed or in a manner to be likely to endanger persons or property; by driving in
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excess of 100 m.p.h. with his headlights tumed off after 9:18 p.m., with other
vehicles on the roadway." (R., p.1?)
The elements of both reckless driving and felony eluding, and the manner in
which they were charged, establish a connection between the criminal conduct and
endangering another person - in this case, Mr. Clark.

Even if the elements and

charging language alone do not establish a connection, there was a connection in
this case since Mr. Clark's injuries were sustained in reaction to Corbus's criminal
conduct.

The district court, therefore correctly concluded there was a "sufficient

causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and
the injuries Mr. Clark sustained."

(R., p.164.)

Corbus has failed to establish

otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Order
of Restitution.
DATED this 30 th day of March 2009.

JE~ELLO

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30 th day of March 2009, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
ERIC FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

JES
Dep y Attomey General
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